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Abstract/Resumen
Complexities associated with the management of common pool resources (CPR) threaten 
governance at some marine protected areas (MPA). In this paper, using economic experimental 
games (EEG), we investigate the effects of both external regulation and the complementarities 
between internal regulation and non-coercive authority intervention—what we call co-
management—on fishermen’s extraction decisions. We perform EEG with fishermen inhabiting 
the influence zone of an MPA in the Colombian Caribbean. The results show that co-
management exhibits the best results, both in terms of resource sustainability and reduction in 
extraction, highlighting the importance of strategies that recognize communities as key actors 
in the decision-making process for the sustainable use and conservation of CPR in protected 
areas.
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Marine protected areas (MPA) worldwide are intended to conserve—and in some cases provide 
for sustainable use—the resources and biodiversity they host. In developing countries, however, 
marine protected areas are exposed to pressures generated by human activities, the most 
important of these being tourism and fishing. The conflict between conservation goals in MPAs 
and fishermen’s private interests is typical of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990), which are 
characterized by both non-excludability and rivalry (Feeny et al., 1990). Fisheries are one of the 
best examples of common-pool resources—individual fishermen only assume the private costs of 
their actions; they ignore the social costs, and collectively engage in the over exploitation of a 
resource they perceive as “free” (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). Hardin (1968), suggested that the 
self-centered and shortsighted behavior of these agents leads to the overuse and rapid depletion 
of fisheries’ resources, in what he calls “the tragedy of the commons.”  
 
Hardin (1968) proposed two general solutions for avoiding “this tragedy”: (i) establishing private 
property rights; and (ii) establishing state property rights, whereby access and use are clearly 
instituted and regulated.  
 
The National Natural Park “Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo” (NNP-CRSB), which is located 
in the Caribbean Sea, is one of seven marine protected areas in Colombia. This park is 
considered to be of great strategic importance, as it conserves the most developed fringe of the 
coral reef of the Continental Colombian marine platform (UAESPNN, 2006). One of the most 
visible sources of pressure on this protected area’s resources is its exploitation by native 
communities. Similar to other protected marine areas around the world, the creation of a national 
park with laws and regulations controlling access and use has not been sufficient to protect it 
from exploitation. In the NNP-CRSB, many species are endangered and some of them have even 
apparently disappeared locally. In response to this reduction in resources, fishermen have 
increased their efforts, not only by fishing for longer periods and at greater distances from port, 
but also, in some cases, by violating regulations—using inappropriate fishing techniques, 
extracting fish smaller than the minimum size allowed, and even extracting prohibited species. 
This has resulted in conflict between local communities and park authorities; moreover, this 
issue is one of non-negligible concern for Colombia as a whole.  
 
 Several factors might contribute to this situation, making de jure state property seem more de 
facto open access property—i) the size of the park; ii) the physical characteristics and nature of 
 
the resource; iii) strong budget constraints; iv) a lack of information; and v) the complex 
relationship that exists between the community and authorities (Camargo et al., 2009). These 
factors impede reaching an optimal equilibrium—such as is supposed to be achieved through 
centralized control—because assumptions about the accuracy of information, monitoring 
capabilities, sanctioning reliability and the zero cost of administrations do not hold true (Ostrom, 
1990). 
 
Given the problems of assigning property rights and the often weak enforcement of fishery 
regulations, there has been a shift towards the decentralization of the management of fisheries, 
especially in developing countries. In the case of decentralization, the communities themselves 
are responsible for defining the regulatory framework, both with respect to what is and is not 
allowed, and in determining the appropriate punishment if the regulations are not obeyed 
(Ostrom, 1990). This suggests that, to some extent, fishermen exhibit others-regarding 
preferences (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; and Rabin, 1993). 
 
Experimental evidence has also shown that individuals do not always behave purely out of self-
interest, and that they often make decisions that balance their own and collective interests (Davis 
and Holt, 1993; and Kagel and Roth, 1995). Many field and lab experiments support the 
argument that the behavior of an individual might be determined by—in addition to the 
possibility of pure material gain—a consideration of others-regarding preferences (Cardenas, 
2004); among these, such elements as altruism, fairness, reciprocity and reputation could play a 
relevant role (Bowles, 1998; Ostrom, 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; 
and Castillo and Saysel, 2005).  
 
The success and sustainability of internal norms strongly depends on many factors; among these 
are the institutional environment, the social cohesion of the relevant communities, the size of the 
groups involved, and the degree of interaction these communities have with the market. Some 
authors argue that it is doubtful that a pure self-governing institution is a realistic option for a 
case as complex and diverse as fisheries in a modern industrial society, inasmuch as market 
pressures and the reality of integration with surrounding societies may effectively undermine 
collective (traditional) management (Rova, 2004). An intermediate solution would be to combine 
state regulation and user self-management —what is known as co-management—as suggested by 
Feeny et al. (1990). Co-management has been seen as an alternative that would improve both the 
effectiveness and equitability of fishery management as well as compliance with agreed upon 
rules (Jentoft, 1989; and McCay, 1996). 
 
Although many economic experimental games aimed at analyzing the behavior of individuals in 
response to daily-life problems have been carried out in the field (e.g., Cárdenas et al. 2000; 
Cárdenas, 2003; Cárdenas, 2004; and Vélez et al., 2006), few have tested combinations of 
institutions in which cooperation and external control play simultaneous roles.  
 
In this study, we apply a framed field economic experiment—i.e., a laboratory experiment using 
real framing (fishing decisions) and real decision-makers (fishermen) (Harrison and List, 2004). 
In the experiment, we compare three different fishery management approaches using a common 
pool resource model: (i) open access; (ii) external regulation with random monitoring and 
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monetary punishment; and (iii) co-management. These management strategies are compared 
using a between subject design, across real fishermen inhabiting the national park’s influence 
zone. Within the context of the conflict between park authorities and local communities, and 
given the deterioration of the marine resources in the NNP-CRSB, the objective of this paper is 
to investigate the effect of introducing a co-management strategy on decisions concerning how 
much to fish, relative to one based on open access or external regulation. Additionally, we 
investigate whether behavior differs depending on actual place of residency—that is, whether 
fishermen living in communities located within the park behave differently than those living in 
communities located outside of it. In practice, those living in communities located within the 
park are under the authorities’ control, and are therefore subject to their educational programs; 
conversely, those living outside the park have, historically, been less attended to by authorities, 
and consequently have been less likely to engage in activities aimed at the park’s sustainable use. 
 
Based on the motivations and the research question discussed above, the contribution of this 
paper is to test and analyze the complementarities between repeated communication and non-
coercive government regulation—what we call co-management—in reducing extraction for two 
possible levels of stock. In particular, the non-coercive government strategy we test here requires 
the participation of officials from the NNP-CRSB, individuals who work with communities on 
environmental education issues. The involvement of a real official from the NNP-CRSB as an 
additional participant in the experimental game, one which depends on an environmental 
education strategy—as opposed to relying on such coercive strategies as penalties—constitutes 
an innovative approach for field experimental games analyzing CPR dilemmas.  
 
The findings are analyzed using parametric and non-parametric tests; they show that the co-
management rule is the best strategy in terms of both reducing extraction and in sustaining the 
resource. On the other hand, the parametric analysis shows that extraction decisions depend on 
socioeconomic characteristics such as per capita income, likewise, what constitutes the main 
income generating activity; external conditions such as the management strategy; and the 
condition of the stock, among others. Complementing these findings, this study shows that co-
management rule might be an effective strategy not only for individuals located inside national 
parks but also those located outside of them.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: following the provision of background, we present our 
theoretical model. From this, we arrive in the third section at our experimental design and game 
procedures. In the fourth part of the paper, we show our main findings. We present our 
conclusions in the fifth section. 
 
 
2. The Common Pool Resource Experiment 
 
2.1 A dynamic common pool resource game 
 
The experiment is a framed field experiment—i.e., we use a non-student subject pool and frame 
the experiment in real terms, which in our case means that we represent an actual fishing 
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problem. Hence the description below, though of course the modeling framework also holds for 
any other type of common pool resource. The common pool resource for a fishery is described 
by the difficulties in excluding people from fishing where open access exists, yet where at the 
same time, only one person can consume a specific unit of the given resource. Essentially, the 
key characteristic of the common resource problem is that, if acting alone, an individual has an 
incentive to appropriate more of the resource than if coordinating with others regarding how 
much of the resource should be appropriated—i.e., the Nash solution and the social optimal 
solution differ. The model presented below is based on the one proposed by Cárdenas (2004). 
We extend this model by introducing certain dynamic effects by letting the catch rate for fish in 
one period determine the stock of fish in the following period. The benefits (and costs) that a 
fisherman receives from catching fish can be divided into two categories: (i) a private benefit, 
function f(xi, S), which depends on the level of extraction (x), and the cost of which depends on 
the stock of the resource (S); and (ii) the benefits from (or costs of) the catching decisions of all 
relevant fishermen such as affects the resource’s availability for others, function g(.).1 The 
features of non-exclusion and rivalry when fishermen decide to fish are given by the following 
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α , and (ii) an expression that reflects the public effect, . The first 
expression shows individual revenues depending on parameter α (e.g., the price of the fish), the 
individual catch rate (xit), and the individual cost of extraction based on the catch rate, the stock, 
and a technical parameter associated with the cost, β. The second expression shows the effect of 
the joint catch rate on individual benefits. Parameter e represents the maximum amount that each 
fisherman can catch, which is assumed to be equal for all fishermen and that, aggregated as n 
fishermen—ne—reflects the maximum amount of fish that it is possible to catch, given the 
fishermen’s technical capacity. In this way, the expression  shows the availability of 
the resource after extraction by n fishermen, while parameter γ represents the extent of individual 


















We introduce the inter-temporal effects of the catch rate by letting the stock of fish change 
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The evolution equation shows that in period t+1, the resource will equal the stock at the 
beginning of period t, minus the extraction of all fishermen during that period plus the net 
growth function, F(St), which depends on the parameters θ and K.2 Given these functional forms, 
the Nash equilibrium for this model is obtained using the maximization of each fisherman’s net 
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where δ represents the discount factor (δ=1/(1+r)), and r is the relevant discount rate.  
 
Considering the first order conditions for this problem and abstracting from those related to state 
and co-state variables, the maximization condition with respect to the decision variable implies 
that 
 





.       (4) 
 
This expression represents the game’s Nash equilibrium, and shows that the optimum private 
catch rate depends positively on the stock and parameter α, and negatively on the costs of 
catching fish (β), the impact on aggregated benefits (γ), and the discounted inter-temporal price 
of the stock of the resource (δλt+1), which is the user cost. In a static framework, fishermen 
would not consider the latter term. 
 
In order to obtain the catch rate that maximizes the social welfare, a central planner would 
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The first order condition with respect to the catch rate then implies that 
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2 We can assume that the growth function is a logistic function, one where parameter θ represents the implicit 
growth rate and parameter K the carrying capacity of the resource. 
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Expression (6) shows that when analyzing the social welfare, the optimal catch rate must be 
lower than that indicated in expression (4), as the proportion of the available stock of fish 
affecting benefits (γ) needs to be aggregated for n fishermen in order to capture the full cost of 
the catch rate decisions. 
 
2.2 A dynamic common pool resource game with a monetary penalty 
 
In order to incorporate the effect of any external regulations—that is, the probability, ρ, that a 
fisherman is being monitored—we define overfishing as the amount of fish caught above the 
social optimal level , and the fine for each unit caught above the permitted level as m. 
If we add these variables to equation (5), we get  
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Solving for the first order conditions (and assuming a risk-neutral individual) we obtain the 
optimal private catch level when external regulations are imposed with imperfect monitoring:  
 







.      (8) 
 
Based on this theoretical framework, we are able to design our experiment.  
 
 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
 
The experiment was performed in two phases, both of which were divided into ten rounds. Each 
group contains 5 members, and the members of each group remain the same for all periods of the 
experiment. During the first phase of the experiment, all of the groups played a common pool 
resource game without any regulations. During the second phase—i.e., the last ten periods—the 
groups were randomly allocated one of three possible treatments: (i) no regulation or baseline, 
(ii) external regulation, or (iii) co-management.  
 
Expressions (4) and (6) are used to construct the pay-off tables that participants used during the 
game. Following the common pool resource experiments conducted by Cárdenas (2004), we 
determined that each fisherman should be able to extract any integer amount between 1 and 8. To 
create the pay-off matrix utilized in the experiment, we set the parameters as α = 100; β= 800; 
and γ = 20. Similar to Cárdenas (2004), we obtain a corner solution for the social optimum equal 
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to one.3 In order to make the game cognitively easier and understandable for the subjects, we 
decided to only simulate two levels of stock—a high level (abundant) and a low level (scarce). 
More specifically, we set the former at 80 units and the latter at 40 units. Based on this, we 
constructed two payoff tables, one for each stock level. The pay-off tables show the net benefits 
for individual i of different combinations of individual and aggregated extractions (see Appendix 
A). If a player does not take into account the inter-temporal effects of his or her decisions, the 
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Expression (4’) is equivalent to a myopic Nash equilibrium, which we used as a benchmark in 
the experiment. To obtain Nash equilibriums, we used the parameters and two levels of stock 
mentioned above; this yields a Nash equilibrium equal to 8 units for the high stock level and 4 
units for the low stock level. Given that x ranges between 1 and 8 and that the benefit function is 
quadratic for the level of extraction and non-linear for the level of stock, the predicted Nash 
equilibrium for abundance (high stock) is a corner solution, while that for scarcity is an interior 
solution. Following the theoretical model, the expected Nash equilibrium for the game assuming 
high stock corresponds to a level of extraction of 8 units per player (40 units per group); the 
Nash equilibrium assuming low stock corresponds to an extraction of 4 units per player (20 units 
per group). On the other hand, the social equilibrium corresponds to a level of extraction of 
1 unit (5 units per group) for either stock level.  
 
In the case of external regulation, the Nash equilibrium corresponds to an extraction of six units 
for high stock and three units for low stock. 
 
The dynamic part of the game was designed as follows: if the aggregated extraction of the 
group’s five members exceeds 20 units, the stock of the resource for the next round becomes 
low; the low availability of the resource in next round is caused by over-extraction during the 
current round. Under a low-stock scenario, every unit of extraction earned fewer points than 
under a high-stock scenario, inasmuch as the low availability of the resource implied more effort 
per unit of fish caught—this translates into fewer benefits. Conversely, if extraction by the whole 
group is less than 20 units, during the next round, the stock of the resource becomes abundant 
(i.e., there is high availability). High stock requires less effort per unit of fish caught, and thus 
translates into higher returns. Figure 1shows the dynamic component of the experiment.  
 
During the first ten periods, there was open access fishing; the last ten periods, conversely, were 
characterized by one out of the three treatments randomly assigned to each group.  
 
 Treatment 1: Open access. This treatment was assigned to the control group; the same 
conditions prevailed as during the first phase. 
 
                                                 
3  Cárdenas (2004) argues that it is convenient to eliminate the zero extraction option when conducting experiments 
so as to avoid conflicts that arise due to villagers’ strong aversion to prohibitions against using resources altogether.  
 7
 
 Treatment 2: External regulation with fine. The objective of this treatment was to induce 
subjects to extract only one unit of the resource, using the imposed fine as an external regulator. 
In order to simulate imperfect enforcement, the monitoring decision was random and every 
player had a one-tenth probability of being monitored per round. Operatively, imperfect 
monitoring was carried out using 10 balls in a bag—five white and five red, with each red one 
being numbered. Each player was assigned a corresponding number. For each fishing round, a 
ball was taken from the bag—if it was white, no monitoring occurred; if it was red, the player 
whose number corresponded to that on the ball was inspected. If the individual inspected had 
violated the rule, he or she had to pay a fine equivalent to 200 points per each unit extracted 
above what was allowed; this was deducted from the gains made during that round. The ball was 
then returned to the bag; in this way, each player had the possibility of being monitored more 
than once. All of the other rules were the same as in the baseline, and decisions, as well as fines, 
were kept private and confidential. No communication was permitted between players. 
 
 Treatment 3: Co-management, with internal and external non-coercive intervention. 
Under this treatment, before starting the second phase, the group had the opportunity to talk for 
up to five minutes with a national park ranger, who was introduced to the game as an “advisor.” 
The ranger had to base his or her conversation on a pre-designed script, effectively expressing 
his or her ideas about conserving park resources and trying to persuade each group member to 
extract only one unit of the resource. After that, the group had five minutes to discuss the 
ranger’s recommendations between themselves. Neither the park representative nor the group 
members were allowed to make promises or threats during or after the game. Any interventions 
by the park officer were recorded. The group members then made their final decisions—in 
private and under strict confidentiality—for the first period of the second phase; the total amount 
extracted was then announced. For each successive round, the park representative was given one 
minute to talk with the group, following which, group members had one minute to discuss. 
 
Every participant in the experiment obtained points, convertible into money; the average final 
payment was thus equivalent to the income they would have obtained during a typical working-
day. At the current rate, this payment is equivalent to 10 dollars per player. Payments were 
confidential.  
 
At every location, a group of 25 to 30 people was gathered and organized into subgroups of five 
persons each. Each five-person group represented the collective decision-making entity with 
respect to the experiment; each member made individual, private and confidential decisions that 
were treated anonymously. The anonymity and confidentiality of individual decisions were 
guaranteed by seating players back-to-back as well as by the presence of a researcher who 
monitored and supervised each group and collected the individual extraction levels written down 
by the fishermen. With the support of an environmental educator—an expert in working with 
communities—the game was explained to each group of fishermen. To facilitate this–inasmuch 
as the participants all tended to come from low-educated communities—different visual aids 
were used, such as drawings and posters. In addition, following explanation, three training 
rounds were carried out in order to ensure that the participants fully understood the game before 
starting it. Following completion of the experiment, the participants filled out surveys. The main 
results of the game were then presented and discussed openly with the subjects and park officers. 
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This socialization was very useful for thinking about and discussing different ways of managing 
park resources, likewise, the lessons obtained as to the most effective way to use them. 
 
 
4. The Results 
 
The experiment was carried out in eight northern Colombian fishing communities, and was 
inclusive of 195 subjects. Three of the communities are located within the borders of the NNP-
CRSB; the other five are located outside of them, yet extract resources from the park area. In 
addition to testing the effects of the co-management treatment, we were interested in learning 
whether communities located inside and outside the park borders responded differently to the 
different management strategies.  
 
Within the communities located inside the park, players averaged 30 years of age; 13 percent 
were women and the per capita income was equivalent to almost half the minimum wage when 
family-size was weighted (adults were weighted double what kids were). Outside the park, the 
average age of players was close to 39; only 3 percent of players were women and scaled income 
was lower than that of players residing inside the park. Most of the participants reported fishing 
as their main activity (68 percent for those inside the park, and 84 percent for those outside of it). 
The distribution of players for each zone based on the treatment they were subjected to is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
4.1 Sustainability of the use of the resource 
 
Recalling that the stock level in the game reflects the inter-temporal effects of decisions, we 
measure the sustainability in the use of the resource as the proportion of periods that a group 
achieves a high stock during a phase of the game. The measurement ranges from 0 to 100 
percent; the closer the number to 100, the higher the level of sustainability. The results show that 
while during the first phase (periods 1-10), on average, the stock exhibited abundance 37 percent 
of the time, during the second phase (periods 11-20), and under the treatment where players 
continued to have open access, high stock availability was achieved 42 percent of the time. The 
difference between phases 1 and 2 is not statistically significant.4 Under the treatment featuring 
external regulation, a high stock was achieved 66 percent of the time during the second phase. 
This is significantly higher than what was achieved under the baseline. Under the treatment 
featuring co-management, high availability was achieved 89 percent of the time. Again, this is 
significantly higher than what was achieved under the baseline (Figure 2). 
 
In Table 2, we present the same analyses as in Figure 2, but here the figures are discriminated by 
location, i.e. inside versus outside the park. The difference in the proportion of periods with high 
stock levels is significant across locations for the open-access treatment and external-regulation 
                                                 
4 Given that there is no a priori information by which we can assume any particular distribution, we performed non-
parametric tests in order to evaluate the differences in means. More specifically, a Mann-Whitney test was 
performed. The Mann-Whitney, or Wilcoxon test, evaluates the hypothesis that two independent samples are from 
populations with the same distribution. 
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treatment; there is no significant difference for the co-management treatment. If the proportion of 
periods showing high availability reflects the sustainability of the use of the resource, the 
external regulation treatment applied to those players living outside the park proved relatively 
effective as a tool for encouraging sustainable use of the resource; this reflects the reluctance of 
those communities located outside the park to comply with external and coercive rules. The 
results also show that the impacts associated with co-management are consistently better for 
communities located both inside and outside the park.  
 
4.2 Extraction decisions 
 
According to the design of the experiment, the expected theoretical extraction level under the 
non-cooperative setting is eight units for high stock and four units for low stock; the social 
optimum is one unit. Nonetheless, when players were exposed to the game under the baseline 
treatment (i.e., during the first phase), the total average extraction was 4.73 units, which 
apparently seems to constitute a moderate extraction, given the range of plausible extractions (1-
8). What is relevant for our analysis, however, is the extraction averages under each stock level. 
For high stock, the average extraction was 5.19 units, which is almost three units below the 
expected Nash equilibrium for that level of stock. This finding, which assumes open access, 
confirms the previous findings from the field experiment literature, where individuals deviated 
from self-centered and individualistic behavior when making individual decisions that seemed to 
incorporate collective interests, even where no institutions were present. However, for low stock 
and open access, the average extraction was 4.45 units, 0.45 units above the expected 
equilibrium, which constitutes a privately inefficient response from players. Recall that although 
the private equilibrium for low stock is four units, individuals might still extract up to eight units. 
Cárdenas et al. (2002) find a similar response in the field experiments they carried out in 
Colombia, likewise using interior solutions like the one we used here for low stock.  
 
The most interesting part of the analysis concerns what happens during the second phase (periods 
11-20), when the treatments are applied to the game. Table 3 shows the findings for extraction 
decisions during the two phases. During the second phase, extractions dropped from an average 
of 4.73 units to 3.37 units. The results, however, vary depending on which rules are applied and 
the level of stock (whether high or low). With respect to differences in extraction decisions, both 
standard tests on differences and the non-parametric tests (the Mann-Whitney statistic, or MWS 
(see Table 3) are consistent with all cases. 
 
As expected, for the continued baseline treatment, the participants did not exhibit a significant 
change in their decisions. Differences for high and low stocks are not significant between phases 
under an open access treatment as well. However, columns 8 and 9 of Table 3  show that on 
average, the rules were effective in reducing the level of extraction regardless of the condition of 
the stock. 
 
Particularly in the case of external regulation, it is observed that during the second phase, 
individuals extracted less—for both high and low stock—than they did during the first phase; 
these are significant differences. For instance, Table 3  shows that for high stock, the external 
regulation treatment causes individuals to extract 1.92 units less than they would under open 
access. In the same way, for low stock, individuals facing external regulation extract 0.65 units 
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less than when facing open access. Similar behavior is observed when the co-management 
treatment is applied. Here, individuals extract less than when facing open access, regardless of 
the level of stock. The reduction in extraction when applying the co-management treatment—
compared with an open access scenario—was by 2.46 units for high stock and 1.49 units for low 
stock; those reductions are highly significant.  
 
Another relevant issue that needs to be analyzed is the effect of community location on 
extraction decisions. Table 4 shows that players living in communities located outside the park 
extracted more on average than those located inside the park for both stock conditions (0.29 units 
more for high stock and 0.51 units more for low stock). However, Table 4 also shows that 
extraction decisions varied between outside and inside communities depending on the treatment 
applied. For instance, for both the open access and external regulation treatments, extraction 
averages for communities located inside the park tended to be lower than those for communities 
located outside it; these differences are significant. The effect was different, however, under the 
co-management treatment: here, on average, players residing outside the park decided to extract 
less than players residing inside it when the stock was abundant. When the stock was low, the 
difference between inside and outside communities was not significant. This observation 
suggests an interesting policy implication—while external regulation did not have a strong effect 
on the decisions made by fishermen living outside the park, the combination of internal 
communication and non-coercive intervention by park rangers did induce them to reduce their 
extraction to the lowest observed extraction averages. This could imply that, when recognized by 
authorities and when education, training and participation are used as tools for encouraging 
positive action, fishermen are open to participating in rules aimed at the sustainable use of 
resources. 
 
4.3 Parametric analysis 
 
So far, these results provide some evidence that rules such as external regulations and co-
management are able to modify extraction behavior; co-management would seem the most 
relevant in terms of reducing extraction and inducing sustainability in the management of the 
resource. The results also suggest that participants living in communities located outside of the 
park may have different incentives than those living in communities located inside of it. 
Consequently, their decisions may also be different. Additionally, the results provide some 
evidence that stock availability may exert certain changes in extraction patterns. These results, 
however, do not consider the effects of certain variables, such as socioeconomic conditions and 
multivariate relations. A parametric analysis is therefore proposed in order to validate these 
results. 
 
In our econometric model, the dependent variable is the level of extraction, while the statistic 
unit of analysis is the individual observation of the level of extraction for each round. Given that 
there are several observations associated with each particular player (for 10 rounds), the data are 
treated as a panel, wherein the correlated error with respect to the observations for each 
participant is considered apart from the error associated with between-player differences. As the 
dependent variable takes discrete values for integers one through eight, the proposed 
specification is a count data model. To consider the possibility of over dispersion, the model is 
treated as a negative binomial one. 
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Regarding the independent variables, we use several categories of variables: 
 
a. Treatment variables. The main hypothesis of this study concerns whether different rules 
have different impacts on individual decisions. To test this, we introduce two categorical 
variables: an external regulation, which takes a value of one if the player was exposed 
to it, and zero otherwise; and co-management, which takes a value of one if the player 
was subjected to it, and zero otherwise. Given that co-management implies the 
participation of a park officer, and that we had three different rangers help us with the 
experiments, two categorical variables are included in order to control for their 
participation, and to see if the results differed based on which park official was 
involved—ranger1 or ranger2.  
 
b. Dynamic variables. Two other variables relevant to participant behavior in the game are 
also included: the current stock level, which takes a value of one if the stock during the 
round in question was high, and zero if it was low .We also control for the previous 
stock level, with a categorical variable that takes a value of one if during the previous 
round the stock was high, and zero if it was low. 
 
c. Socioeconomic and demographic variables. The characteristics of individual players may 
exert influence on their final decisions. Six variables are included under this category: 
gender is represented by a categorical variable that takes a value of one if the player is a 
woman, and zero otherwise. Per capita income is calculated by dividing the household 
income between the household’s members; household size is weighted by considering 
household members younger than 18 years of age as one half an adult. Information 
concerning the main income-generating activities of participants allowed us to further 
divide them based on whether they engaged in agriculture, the manufacture of 
handcrafts, trade, and other activities. Finally, there is a categorical variable, location, 
which takes a value of one if the player lives inside the park, and zero otherwise. 
 
d. Perception variables. After the experiment, a survey was conducted of the participants. In 
this survey, questions about perception were included; two of these were used in the 
model. The usefulness of participation was represented by a categorical variable taking 
a value of one if the respondent answered yes to the question: Do you think that 
participating in meetings about the management of the park is useful for solving natural 
resource-related conflicts? The second one, concerning the enforcement ability of park 
authorities, was represented by a categorical variable that took a value of one if the 
participant answered yes to the question: Do you think that park authorities have enough 
capability to enforce rules in the park area? In both cases, the variable took a value of 
zero if the respondent answered no to the question.  
 
The results for the model are presented in Table 5. Our main hypothesis, that treatments are 
effective in reducing the level of extraction, is confirmed—regulation and co-management did 
reduce extraction levels significantly. It is also clear that co-management represents a more 
effective approach, as the reduction in the level of extraction was about five times what the case 
with external regulation was. Having different rangers participate in co-management affected 
group performance in a significant way as well—rangers 1 and 2 induced a reduction about one 
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third less than that induced by the base ranger (ranger 3). These results imply that officers might 
use different strategies in convincing communities to extract less, and that these different 
strategies may result in significant differences in players’ decisions.  
 
With respect to the level of stock, an interesting way of analyzing its dynamic effects is by 
combining previous and current stock availabilities along with observed coefficients. In Table 6, 
the effect of the four combinations of previous and current stock on extraction decisions is 
observed. The previous and current low availability constitute the baseline. Now, if the previous 
stock level was low and the current stock level is high, individuals will tend to extract more (0.17 
units more than the baseline case); conversely, if the previous availability was high and the 
current stock level is low, extraction is reduced by 0.19 units. Where players faced high 
availability the previous round and the current round also exhibits a high level of availability, the 
level of extraction remains the same compared to the baseline case (that is, the value is not 
statistically different from zero). Those results are coherent with expected player behavior with 
respect to resource extraction under different stock levels. 
 
From the non-parametric analysis, some information was obtained about the differences in the 
results with respect to the place of residence. However, in the parametric analysis, the variable 
itself shows no significance with respect to extraction decisions. The location effect is absorbed 
by other variables in the model when a multivariate analysis is performed.  
 
The socioeconomic variables included show that women tend to extract less, although the 
difference is not significant. The per capita income coefficient shows that the poorest players 
extracted less than richer ones; here, the difference is significant. This result challenges the usual 
assumption that the poorest groups in society are responsible for the environmental degradation 
of ecosystems, and suggests that this assumption should be revisited. It is important to recall, 
however, that among the participants, income levels were not widely distributed. Those 
participants that were mainly devoted to the manufacture of handcrafts exhibited a lower level of 
extraction compared to other groups, while those engaged in agriculture and trade did not exhibit 
a significant difference from the baseline group, which mainly consisted of fishermen. 
 
Perception analysis shows that those individuals that believe in the usefulness for solving 
problems of participating in meetings about the performance and importance of protected areas 
are the same individuals with lower levels of extraction, which is a coherent response. Similarly, 
those who believe that authorities are well equipped to enforce regulations in park areas also 
tended to extract less during the game. 
 
The regression as a whole explains extraction decisions, and there is no evidence of over-
dispersion in the regression.  
 
These results confirm that rules play an important role in defining the pattern of use of common 
pool resources. Other characteristics, such as socioeconomic and perception variables, also play 
an important role, and the interaction between them generates the current pattern of resource use 






Generally speaking, co-management can be defined as an institutional arrangement in which 
several degrees of power and responsibility are shared between state and local agents for the 
management of a CPR. This arrangement implies the shared governance of resources between 
state regulation and self governing institutions (Feeny et al., 1990). In this study, we tested 
collaborative management strategies by conducting a CPR experiment in which we combined the 
possibility of repeated communication between players with external non-coercive intervention 
by actual natural park officials.  
 
The results from our study support some previous findings from other experiments. First, unlike 
predictions based on standard theory, they show that individuals do not extract the maximum 
amount of resources allowed—i.e., their decisions deviate from the predicted Nash equilibriums. 
Second, the field experiments we performed within fishing communities confirm previous 
empirical evidence related to the role of external regulation in the management of CPRs. 
However, our findings reveal that external regulation plays a weak role in controlling the levels 
of extraction associated with CPRs, in particular, with respect to communities located outside 
protected areas. 
 
Additionally, the results from our study contribute both to behavioral economics and the CPR 
management literature for two reasons. First, the inclusion of a treatment wherein an actual park 
official—one who works on a daily basis on environmentally educating communities—
participated as an agent in the experiment, was for the purpose of testing complementarities 
between communication and non-coercive authority intervention, as an alternative to coercive 
external regulation. This innovative treatment showed the best results in terms of extraction 
levels, not only for communities located inside the park but also for those that fished within the 
park, but were located outside of it. The levels of extraction under the co-management treatment 
were significantly lower compared with those under any other treatment, for all locations where 
the games were carried out. This finding suggests that non-coercive strategies could generate 
better responses from communities than coercive ones, in terms of the conservation and 
improved management of CPRs. This may not only be because of reduced asymmetries in 
information brought about by interaction between fishermen and park officials, but also because 
communication allows agents to recognize that social conservation goals, community (collective) 
interests, and individual interests can be satisfied simultaneously, and that they are 
complementary rather than opposed to one another.  
 
Fishermen know and recognize that over-exploitation and the use of inadequate fishing methods 
cause degradation and, in the end, deplete marine resources. They also know, however, that 
acting individually, they cannot change the situation. This is what happens, as Ostrom (1990) 
establishes, when individuals are unable to communicate with one another and have no way to 
develop trust, or do not have the capacity to recognize explicitly that they share a common goal. 
In such cases, some external support is necessary to break out of the perverse logic of their 
situation (Ostrom, 1990). This is where the role of authorities—in providing information and 
education, in facilitating and encouraging community participation in the decision-making 




The other contribution is the one related to what we here call resource sustainability. We 
measured the sustainability in the use of the resource by analyzing the proportion of rounds in 
which individuals allowed the resource to reach a state of high availability. During the baseline 
rounds—that is, when there was open access—the number of rounds with low resource 
availability exceeded the number of rounds with high availability. This suggests that individuals 
act myopically, in the sense that they do not take into account the effect of current decisions on 
the future state of the resource. Conversely, during the second stage of the game, when rules 
were imposed, individuals maintained a higher number of rounds with high resource availability, 
implying that rules might have an effect on the inter-temporal decisions of players. This suggests 
that rules can play a relevant role in inducing individuals to incorporate future effects into their 
current extraction decisions regarding the state of the resource being exploited.  
 
Parametric analyses confirmed our findings derived from non-parametric tests, regarding (i) the 
role of rules in reducing extraction; and (ii) the fact that the condition of the resource (whether 
high or low) is an important determinant of fishermen’s extraction decisions. Our findings 
regarding fishermen’s perceptions on the enforcement capabilities of park authorities and the 
relevance of meeting with them about resource management have policy implications, as they 
might indicate that a balanced combination of control and non-coercive intervention may be a 
suitable strategy for protecting these areas. The parametric analysis yielded another interesting 
finding that challenges a generally held belief—richer fishermen extract more than poorer ones. 
This latter result constitutes a motivation for deeper research.  
 
Finally, in addition to their value for testing new rules, field experiments also work as a 
pedagogical tool that encourages fishermen to actively participate in, communicate about, and 
discuss problems related to fisheries. This is an important aspect of the experiments, especially 
with respect to fishermen that often have low levels of education, such as are generally found in 
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Appendix A. Pay-off tables  
 
 









Table 1. The Number of players and groups residing inside and outside the park based on 
the treatment they were subjected to. 
 
Treatment Zone Baseline External reg. Co-management Total 
Players outside of the park 25 45 45 115 
Players inside of the park 20 25 35 80 





Table 2. The percentage of periods in the second phase during which stock was highly 
available according to location and treatment. 
 
Treatment a Zone Baseline External regulation Co-management 
Outside of the park 32% 59% 89% 
Inside of the park 55% 80% 89% 
Difference -23%*** -21%*** 0%ns 
Total 42% 66% 89% 
Mann-Whitney stat. -4.903*** -5.663*** 0.141ns 
Pr(out>in) 0.385 0.394 0.502 
*** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10%  ns non-significant 
 
a Two tests can be used to evaluate for differences between the groups. The first is a standard t-
test on mean differences, the significance of which is presented in the row labeled “Difference.” 













High Low High Low High Low High Low Total 
Phase 1 5.49 4.31 5.51 4.48 4.81 4.54 5.19 4.45 4.73 
Phase 2 5.15 4.24 3.59 3.80 2.35 3.04 3.16 3.88 3.37 





*** 1.49*** 2.03*** 0.57*** 1.35*** 
Rounds  73 107 138 142 206 114 417 363 780 




























Table 4 Average extraction decisions for each treatment according to location with respect 













Phase 2 Total gameZone 







Outside 4.63 5.54 4.41 6.15 3.98 4.18 3.20 2.08 4.06 3.26 4.44 4.00 




























Total 4.45 5.19 4.24 5.15 3.80 3.59 3.04 2.35 3.88 3.16 4.27 3.86 
























































Table 5 The negative binomial estimates for individual extraction during the second phase 
of the game. 
 
 Dependent variable: individual extraction Coefficient Std. Err. 
External regulation (1 yes 0 no) -0.151* 0.090 
Co-management (1 yes 0 no) -0.785*** 0.122 
Ranger 1 (1 yes 0 no) 0.339** 0.137 
Ranger 2 (1 yes 0 no) 0.368*** 0.122 
Current stock level (1 high 0 low) 0.171*** 0.038 
Previous stock level (1 high 0 low) -0.190*** 0.036 
Location (1 inside 0 outside the park) 0.031 ns 0.072 
Player gender  (1 woman 0 man) -0.179 ns 0.143 
Per capita scaled income (minimum monthly wages) 0.219* 0.115 
Main activity: Handcraft  (1 yes 0 no) -0.666*** 0.214 
Agriculture (1 yes 0 no) -0.111 ns 0.293 
Trade  (1 yes 0 no) -0.074 ns 0.153 
Participation is useful  (1 yes 0 no) -0.168** 0.072 
Enforcement ability of park authorities  (1 yes 0 no) -0.138* 0.081 
Constant 1.580*** 0.108 
Observations 1590 
Groups 159 
Wald Chi-sq(k) 181.47 





Table 6. The effect of changes in the stock availability on extraction decisions. 
 
Current stock  
Low High 
Low 0 0.170*** Previous stock High -0.190*** -0.020 ns 










First Phase and Second Phase
(1-20 rounds)
Beginning of round • Each player can extract from 1 to 8 units
• The group can extract from 5 to 40 units
If group extraction < = 20 units,
then: next round with high availability 
of the resource
If group extraction > 20 units, then:
next round with low availability of
the resource
Pay-off table= high Pay-off table = low
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